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Background: China has become a global player in the field of biosamples research and analysis of genetic data.
The Beijing Genomics Institute is a genetics factory where enormous amounts of biosamples/data from all over the
world are being analyzed. Most of the global bioethics discussions focused on research conducted by scientists
from industrialized countries with subjects from poorer countries. Today, however, samples from industrialized
nations are being analyzed in China on an unprecedented scale. This means that one should not just focus on
bioethics developments in western countries, but also should pay attention to the situation in China. Under this era of
rapid advancement in genomics, reassessing the conventionally accepted bioethical principles is strongly needed.
Discussion: In this paper, we will analyze the case of BGI in the context of the Chinese regulatory system in order to
identify methods to regulate genetic research more effectively and to strengthen BGI’s role in international
collaborative research projects. Three main issues concerning sample collection and samples/data management are
addressed. Firstly, an ambiguous definition of research, which does not specifically include biosamples/data, when
applied to genetic research, may cause confusion and leave loopholes in governance. Secondly, the current regulations
do not provide sufficient guidelines on the details of what information to present to prospective subjects, and how to
combine informed consent with strategies of re-consent, withdrawal and feedback from research. Finally, the existing
regulations do not adequately address issues of genetic privacy and data protection.
Summary: Bioethical issues related to genetic research in China may be partially due to the nature of genetic research
and partially stems from the strategy of simply adopting general international guidelines into the Chinese context
without detailed considerations of the local needs. However, there are no perfect readymade ethical solutions for
everyone; every country faces different open questions and challenges behind what appears to be unified guidelines.
Given the importance of China in international genetic research, other countries ought to be concerned about the
bioethical developments in China. China should also have a substantive discussion with the international community
on bioethics issues.
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The Beijing Genomics Institute (BGI) is an internationally
renowned institute conducting research at the forefront of
science with multitudes of cutting-edged equipment. It
has surprised the world with its rapid growth and its
wide expanding business scope. Given the success of in-
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unless otherwise stated.player in the field of genome sequencing and a hugely
influential powerhouse in international genetic research
collaborations [1].
However, along with the praise, there are also ques-
tions and queries. The concerns arise not only because
of BGI’s scale and capacity as a powerful global genetics
factory, but also because of worries about the Chinese
regulatory system lagging behind the striding pace of
this genetic giant. This makes BGI an ideal case for this
paper to reflect on the practical governance and bio-
ethical issues facing genetic research in China.td. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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This paper will use BGI as a point of departure to reflect
on some crucial bioethical issues in the existing system
of governance of biomedical research in China. We will
mainly focus on some highlighted concerns about exist-
ing regulations on genetic research, in particular on how
to provide information to research subjects, and the is-
sues of privacy and data protection.
BGI has presented its development blueprint in a pub-
lished interview [2]. It consists of four parts or phases.
The first part is BGI’s own scientific research. In 1999,
when geneticists from the US and other countries gath-
ered and embarked on the Human Genome Project
(HGP), the initial research group of BGI for the first time
proposed that China should join in the project and later
undertook 1% of the workload. After the HGP, BGI under-
took 10% of the workload of the International Human
HapMap Project (HapMap) in 2002 [3]. In 2008, they took
part in the International 1000 Genomes Project (1000
Genomes) and the International Cancer Genome Project
(ICGC Project). BGI’s research capacity and quality of re-
search are highly noteworthy. From 2001 to 2013, around
250 papers have been published in first-class journals [4].
With more than one hundred top-notch sequencers and a
strong dedicated team of researchers, BGI research groups
are strongly competitive which attracts further research
and development cooperation from scientific counter-
parts, pharmaceutical industries, and hospitals. This also
gives BGI strong credence to apply for funding from the
government and other sources.
The second part is the sequencing and analysis service
for scientific and technological institutions and pharma-
ceutical companies. This part of the business now earns
the company over one billion RMB in income per year,
and has become the mainstay of their economic re-
sources. It is estimated that the income could increase
tenfold in the future [2].
The third part is medical/clinical services collabora-
tions with hospitals such as analyzing clinical samples.
This part may also draw huge attention from investors,
and is expected to continue to generate substantial rev-
enue and economic benefits for BGI. This clinical sam-
ple analyzing business is evaluated to be worth 10 billion
RMB when BGI sold a part of its shares to raise capital
for purchasing Complete Genomics in 2012 [2]. Testing
services is at present mainly about reproductive health,
such as prenatal noninvasive genetic testing (PNGT) for
chromosome trisomy abnormalities and testing for other
hereditary diseases. BGI also offers testing for infectious
diseases, blood diseases and cancer [5].
The last part is testing for individual consumers, which
is a downstream goal for BGI. The goal is to use per-
sonal genetic information in clinical routine practice
when the cost of sequencing and analysis becomes lowenough and the diagnostic usefulness of the information
has been improved sufficiently.
Concerns have been raised in general about quality
controls in various companies involved in testing of clin-
ical samples in China. From September 2013 to February
2014, the National Health and Family Planning Commis-
sion (NHFPC, former Ministry Of Health) and the China
Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) issued several
public notifications to strengthen the governance of gen-
etic testing in China. As a result, part of BGI’s commercial
testing services was suspended for using an unapproved
sequencer in clinical diagnosis [6,7]. Later on, the CFDA
reopened a registration channel for genetic testing service
and equipment used in clinics. BGI submitted their mate-
rials, and is still waiting for approval [8]. Concerns have
also been raised about the lack of separation of the various
activities, in particular about samples/data management,
and the risk of data appropriation. There is also a general
worry that “unfettered access to the genetic building
blocks of humanity” may actually come true [9].
There is no doubt that BGI carries out reputable re-
search. However, overemphasis on the research part may
lead to a lack of scrutiny of more questionable practices in
clinical genetic testing. In this paper, we will mainly focus
on the ethical issues arising from the research part, and
the challenges for China to develop an appropriate regula-
tory framework for these types of research activities. This
is not only an important domestic concern but also an
issue of great international significance as BGI is a major
player in many important international research projects.
Table 1 summarizes some of the notable projects BGI is
involved in.
Here are some examples of BGI’s international research
project collaborations. As part of BGI’s Million Human
Genomes Project, BGI and the Children’s Hospital of
Philadelphia (CHOP) launched the 1000 Rare Disease Pro-
ject in 2011 [10]. Scientists from CHOP stated that “BGI’s
capabilities and expertise in whole genome sequencing
and analysis, combined with Children’s Hospital’s exten-
sive biobank and expertise in clinical phenotyping, will
allow scientists and clinicians to harness the power of
large, detailed data sets to improve the lives of patients
and families” [11]. They also claimed that the collabora-
tions would “have the capacity to basically read out and
sequence every child that comes in to CHOP in the near
future” [12]. In the same year, BGI and Merck announced
to establish a collaboration to focus on the discovery and
development of biomarkers and genomic technologies
[13]. BGI and Danish organizations also initiated cooper-
ation for cancer vaccines and the Danish genome research
project, which may develop and patent commercial vac-
cines and establish a database of genetic variations in the
Danish population [14]. In 2013, BGI collaborated with
South Texas Accelerated Research Therapeutic (START)
Table 1 Noted research of BGI under the blueprint
Noted research Classification under the blueprint
HGP, HapMap, 1000 Genomes, ICGC Project Scientific research
BGI & Merck 2011, BGI & Danish 2011, BGI & START 2013 Scientific research, sequencing & analyzing service, further collaborations
The China National Genebank (Shenzhen) Scientific research and further collaborations
PNGT in hospitals, Medical/clinical services
The 1000 Rare Disease Project with CHOP Scientific research, medical/clinical services with potential individual services
in the future
IQ research Scientific research with unclear applications
Cloud storage to manage data crossing boundaries Unclear
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which aims to combine heritable variations with clinical
phenotypes to facilitate personalized medicine develop-
ment. This project is privately funded. START is respon-
sible for patient recruitments, sample and clinical data
collections from local hospitals and BGI is responsible
for the genome sequencing [15]. Furthermore, in 2011,
after approval by the China National Development and
Reform Commission and other national commissions,
BGI-Shenzhen built and operated the China National
Genebank (Shenzhen) [16], to “establish a Biological Re-
source Bank, an Information Database and a Network do-
mestically and across the globe for providing a powerful
support for genomics-related scientific research and appli-
cations to promote the goals of biodiversity protection
and sustainable development” [17].
Over the past few years BGI has sequenced the ge-
nomes of many important species from rice to the giant
panda, human disease samples, some rare diseases [10],
and the first Asian genome [18]. Up to 2012, BGI has se-
quenced 540 plant and animal genomes, 25,239 variant
copies and 38,123 human samples [19]. BGI’s machines
generate six terabytes of data each day [20] and a huge
amount of data need to be handled across the country and
overseas on its network. Cloud storage is being used to
electronically share data [21]. An internal test conducted
by BGI reveals that it merely takes 30 seconds to move a
24-gigabyte file between China and the USA [22].
Some of these projects have indeed raised concerns
outside of China. In February 2013, The Wall Street
Journal posted a news article titled: “A Genetic Code for
Genius” [23] that reports a sensitive IQ study by BGI.
2,200 DNA samples, mostly from America, allegedly of
the brightest people with IQs of 160 or higher were used
for sequencing, in an attempt to find the genetic basis of
IQ. A behavioral geneticist who engages in this research
claims such understanding could help prepare support
in advance for kids who are identified as having learning
problems. The news article pointed out worries on how
genetic data on IQ could be misconstrued or misused.
“Research into the science of intelligence has been used in
the past ‘to target particular racial groups or individualsand delegitimize them,….the reductionist and determinis-
tic trends that still are very much present in the world of
genetics would come to the forefront in a project like this”
[23]. A catchy headline on BBC, “China’s designs to engin-
eer genius babies” no doubt has added fuel to fire in this
discussion [24].
These high-profile disputes in the mass media undoubt-
edly have raised concerns in the general public about the
company’s operations and how it is regulated. In this
paper, both for the sake of BGI’s own interests and for the
good of the general public, we will focus on the question
whether the Chinese regulatory infrastructure and its eth-
ical institutions are appropriate enough to form the codes
of conduct and guidelines for the sound practice of such a
genetic giant.
Regulatory issues
Before moving forward to the governance and bioethics
s problems derived from BGI in the Chinese context, the
basic Chinese biomedical research regulation framework
will be briefly reviewed.
At the domestic level, in 2010 the National People’s
Congress (NPC) passed the Tort Liability Law of the
People’s Republic of China [25]. Besides domestic laws,
the State Council, NHFPC, the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MST) and CFDA have promulgated and re-
vised a series of laws and regulations to construct a gov-
ernance framework for biomedical research. The main
laws and regulations that involve human genetic re-
search and sample/data management are summarized in
Table 2. With the rapid development of scientific re-
search, some regulations have been updated or revised
in recent years.
China has established a regulatory framework of re-
search that by and large follows international guidelines.
However, considering the actual complex practical con-
texts and new situations emerging with the rapid pro-
gress in genetic research, tensions always exist between
regulations and implementations of these regulations.
This is especially the case for issues related to sample/
data collection and management where there are many
unresolved controversies and every country has their
Table 2 Laws and regulations on genetic research in China
Laws & Regulations
The Interim Procedures for Human Genetic Resources
Management by NHFPC & MST in 1998
Covers research, development and transfer of genetic materials, rules and
procedures of application and approval;
Requires informed consent from donors and relatives for international collaborations
but does not mention IRB review and specific content about informed consent;
States that genetic resources and related information should be protected as state
secrets of science and technology, does not mention sample reuse and research
information feedback to individual donors.
The Good Clinical Practice by CFDA in 2003 To ensure that clinic trials of new medicines are scientifically reliable, protect
subjects’ right and safety;
conforms to Declaration of Helsinki, follows principles of justice, respect and
beneficence/non-maleficence;
Clear requirement to protect the benefits of subjects by appropriate IRB
reviews and informed consent about the clinic trial;
The definition of clinical trial refers research “on human body” that may
be literally inapplicable to genetic research;
The requirement of informed consent does not mention particular issues of
consent for genetic research, which at least should include consent for future
use of samples, feedback and withdrawal from research.
The Ethical Review of Biomedical Research
Involving Human Subjects by NHFPC in 2007
Rules for duties and jurisdictions of IRB, clearly states the constitution of IRB;
Stipulates ethical principles of IRB review with standard procedures;
Clearly requires protection of privacy, subjects can quit at any time without any
condition, re-consent shall be obtained if research protocol has been changed;
The definition of research still literally problematic in genetic research context;
Not provides details about feedback and withdrawal method that fits genetic research.
The Tort Liability Law of the People’s
Republic of China by NPC in 2010
Protects legitimate rights and interests of civil subjects in general, explicitly ensures citizens’
right to life, to health as well as the right of privacy. Especially in the chapter of compensation
for medical damage it notes health care organizations and medical professionals should
protect patients’ privacy and shall bear the liability for tort if patients get damaged due
to privacy leaking or the disclosure of patients’ medical records.
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These tensions are magnified in a developing country
like China that eagerly wants to boost its biomedical in-
dustry, but needs to balance that goal with how to con-
duct research with high integrity. As shown below, if
regulations are too broad or abstract, there would be no
binding power and the regulations would not have any
practical impacts. On the other hand, if regulations are
too rigid, scientific progress could be hampered. Occasion-
ally, an ambiguous terminology in the regulations creates
self-conflicting principles and renders the regulations diffi-
cult to interpret or unenforceable.
Discussion
We have identified two issues of concern with regard to
the Chinese genetic research regulations. First, since there
are variations in the regulations between countries, there
may be ethical inconsistencies in international collabora-
tive projects when BGI has to follow the regulations from
both the country of origin of the samples, and Chinese
regulations. Second, although existing Chinese regulations
apparently follow general international guidelines and
principles, they are too broad to apply to substantiveissues that may arise in current research practices. This
may allow for some questionable practices. In addition, is-
sues such as strategies of combining informed consent
with rules for re-consent, withdrawal and feedback from
research as well as ways the issue of genetic privacy raise
special challenges in genetic research in China. This will
be illustrated in the following discussion.
An ambiguous term in the regulations
Before turning to more substantive issues, let us first
discuss a terminological issue that exists in the current
legislation. This terminological issue actually shows that
policy makers might have simply adopted international
regulations on general research practices without paying
sufficient attention to the special challenges of genetic
research on samples and data.
With regard to human sample collection, the Interim
Procedures for Human Genetic Resources Management
issued by NHFPC & MST in 1998, which covers genetic
research, requires informed consent for international
collaborations but does not mention the need for an IRB
review [27]. Afterwards, the NHFPC promulgated the
Ethical review of biomedical research involving human
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medical research involving human subjects and their in-
formed consent. However, in the definition part, it states
its coverage extends to:
“…biomedical research involving human subjects and
relevant technical applications that …using …ways to
perform research on the human body for knowing…
or …conducting experimental application activities on
the human body by using medical care technology or
product…”
This formulation is ambiguous. It seems that genetic
research projects are exempt from this regulation and
therefore exempt from IRB review if they only use de-
tached samples that have been delinked from their ori-
ginal subjects according to the original legislation in
1998. However, even when using detached human sam-
ples/data, genetic research samples are clearly parts of
the human body and therefore should still be classified
as human subject research and be subjected to IRB re-
view according to the legislation in 2007. In 2012 the
initial draft of the Regulation of the Human Genetic
Resources was published by the State Council for public
comments. Although the regulation has not officially
come into force yet, it would replace the former interim
measures of 1998. The regulation officially requires IRB
review for genetic research. In July 2013, NHFPC issued
the initial draft edition of the Administrative Measures
of Medical Science and Technology Research Involving
Human Subjects for comments. The definition problem
is still there, but this draft clearly classifies human gen-
etic research as a “high risk” type of research which is
subject to more strict reviews. Since the existing regula-
tions leave the definition issue open, the question that
arises from this situation is what review levels should be
used to monitor genetic research before the new regula-
tion takes effect. Moreover, if we take the regulation lit-
erally, the definition of research is also too narrow to
cover psychological and behavioral studies, which means
that this kind of research will fall outside the scope of
the regulatory framework. These potential inconsisten-
cies between various regulations need to be avoided, and
serious thought ought to be given to how the Chinese
regulations should distinguish human subject research
from other types of research, and what oversight mecha-
nisms are appropriate for different types of research on
human subjects.
Withdrawal and feedback from research
There seems to be a general trend towards increased re-
quirements for informed consent in international regula-
tions, requiring researchers to pay more explicit attention
the protection of subjects. The Interim Procedures forHuman Genetic Resources Management of 1998 states that
informed consent is required for genetic international col-
laborations but provides for very general requirements,
and blanket consent for future research. The Ethical re-
view of biomedical research involving human subjects in
2007 clearly requires informed consent for all research
and re-consent is needed if the protocol changes. It also
states that subjects can quit at any time from the research.
The regulation puts subjects in the center of research de-
sign and subjects are protected by means of IRB review
and informed consent. Moreover, with the rise of genetic
research and the importance of biobanks, samples/data in-
stead of the human body are used more frequently in
studies. In light of this, the initial draft of the Regulation of
the Human Genetic Resources in 2012 places further spe-
cific emphasis on genetic research. The draft requires that
the collection and storage of human genetic samples
should abide by principles of autonomy and informed
consent. Before sample collection, written informed con-
sent shall be offered to the donor to explain the purpose,
usage, potential health risks, interest-sharing plans, privacy
protection and other necessary relevant information about
the research. Subjects have the right to quit uncondition-
ally at any time. It also requires that re-consent should be
requested if samples are used for other purposes beyond
the initial consent. Moreover re-consent is needed if gen-
etic samples were originally collected for routine clinical
diagnosis and treatment, or from blood banks, crime in-
vestigations, doping controls, funeral and forensic agencies
not earmarked for genetic research, or used for other re-
search that goes beyond the primary purpose, or for inter-
national cooperation.
Some may favor this draft in terms of its strict require-
ments for specific items of informed consent, but critics
may think it still only dogmatically interprets the general
biomedical international guidelines, and cannot success-
fully handle deeper and controversial dilemmas in gen-
etic research practices. Samples/data usage is different
from traditional human subject research or research on
clinical patients in the sense that protocols or interven-
tions are implemented not directly on the human body
but rather on samples or data that have been detached
from human subjects or patients. Such research is of low
risk of direct harm to the original subjects/patients, but
may harm them indirectly or run against their reasonable
will if the relevant sensitive information is leaked or mis-
used by the researchers. Furthermore, delinked samples/
data may be used multiple times for other purposes which
may expose participants to unknown risks. There is also a
question on how to handle incidental findings in genetic
research that may be important for the welfare of donors/
subjects. The desire to know or not to know research re-
sults or feedback may vary between individuals according
to their autonomy and preferences. Regulations that can
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research subjects are therefore needed.
One empirical study of the opinions of some Chinese
patients and the public towards problems about consent
for the use of clinical leftover samples in research shows
that among 64.7% respondents who are willing to donate
for research, only 16.7% donors wish to keep the with-
drawal option afterwards. Only 12% of the respondents
accepted future research without specific consent and
74.3% respondents wanted to receive feedback of rele-
vant research results [28]. These results are quite differ-
ent from those reported in other countries [29], where
generally a high number of research subjects accept fu-
ture research without consent. It is interesting to point
out that the percentage of those who wish to keep the
withdrawal option and those who consent to future re-
search without the need for re-consent are equally low.
Therefore, there seems to be an inconsistency in these
answers, i.e., we cannot simply conclude that Chinese
subjects place a high or a low value on autonomy. The
low number of people who accept future research with-
out consent implies a high desire for control of what hap-
pens to their samples. On the other hand, the low number
of people who wants to keep the withdrawal option im-
plies a low desire for control of what happens to their
samples. Whatever the empirical study concludes, it does
at least illustrate the complexity of opinions about these
issues, but existing national regulations do not say any-
thing about issues related to feedback and withdrawal
from research. This shows that the current regulations did
not pay appropriate attention to the complex nature of
samples/data usage in genetic research.
These issues have been a subject of intense discussion in
the international bioethics community. There is evidence
of a lack of international consensus on how one should
handle samples/data in different systems and people have
proposed different strategies with regard to informed con-
sent [30]. Some experts propose that a one-time general
consent with an opt-out model would be a preferential op-
tion for biobanks in China. The donor’s wish to withdraw
from research can be guaranteed by the “opt-out” setting.
How the samples are used in the biobank can be revealed
to the donors in ways that are understandable for them
[31]. Internationally, some have evaluated the ethical con-
ditions that justify broad consent for future research and
pointed out that a right to withdraw consent would be ne-
cessary [32]. Some considers the right to withdraw from
research should be assessed on the basis of the potential
harm to the subjects and points out that delinking should
not be the only automatic permissible response to requests
for withdrawal [33]. Others have analyzed how researchers
should confront incidental findings and what obligations
they owe to the research subjects in different circum-
stances [34-36].On examining the regulations of biobanks outside of
China, one can observe quite a flexible approach. For ex-
ample, in the withdrawal procedures of the UK Biobank,
there are options at different levels [37]: no further con-
tact, no further access and no further use. They also allow
sample/data to be disposed of according to the donor’s
wish after considering questions about feedback of re-
search. The donors are also offered options on the right to
know/not to know about research results, and to what ex-
tent the researcher can use his/her samples/data. If such a
flexible and layered withdrawal method could be adopted
by an overseas counterpart, why should China adhere to
the rigid unconditional withdrawal option?
A similar problem appears against feedback strategies
of results from the research. The ethical review standard
specification of the China National Genebank (Shenzhen)
[38] states that unless samples and data have been
delinked from the donor, the donor can withdraw from
the study at any time unconditionally. Although it com-
pares the “opt-in” and “opt-out” model of informed con-
sent, it rules that IRB should check whether samples are
used for purposes beyond what is stated in the original in-
formed consent form, or without the donor’s consent and
whether irretrievable delinkage is performed when sam-
ples/data circulate freely. The policy effectively guarantees
all the subjects the right to quit anytime. However, once
the samples/data have been delinked, they can be reused
freely. This approach potentially suffers from two major
drawbacks. Firstly, it seems that this clause bypasses and
conceals the crucial problem: who has the right to make
the delinking decision that may limit the usefulness of
samples/data, the researcher, the IRB or the donors them-
selves? Secondly, have these delinked subjects been de-
prived of their right to extract their samples/data from the
research database because an IRB thinks delinking is suffi-
cient to protect subjects from potential harm? The ques-
tion becomes more complex when donors in some
countries could be given several withdrawal options but
donors in China only are provided with a single one. This
nonconformity may appear in IRB review when samples
from multiple countries are analyzed in China. Could this
nonconformity be deemed as ethically unacceptable by
treating donors differently? Delinking data also gives rise
to new problems. Delinked data may lose their scientific
value because the patient’s medical history may reveal
valuable information on the underlying genetic conditions.
One might argue that donors should be made aware of
this trade-off before signing on to the research where the
only option of reusing the data is to delink it. In
addition, what if significant results are found in a re-
search project when investigators feel they have a
strong obligation to trace the subjects back, but is then
impossible because samples/data have been irreversibly
delinked? The current regulation simply deals with
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has neglected many other relevant ethical concerns. It
ultimately does not really offer subjects and the public
a chance to actively participate and receive feedback
from research projects they may regard as important.
Therefore, all the above information and options should
be taken into consideration when designing a consent
form for subjects/donors. The form should not just
focus on informed consent, but should provide compre-
hensive information on withdrawal, delinkage, re-consent
for new research purposes, as well as the feedback method
of possible research findings.
Genetic discrimination and risk of data leakage
Concerns have been raised about the sensitive nature of
the research and the enormous amount of data that BGI
handles, especially when there is a risk of genetic dis-
crimination and breach of privacy. As shown above, BGI
handles very sensitive research like the IQ study. BGI also
uses Cloud storage for the massive amount of data they
generate. This may allow easy transfer of data between re-
searchers, but increases the risk of data breaches. Appro-
priate measures to guarantee data security need to be
implemented. Even after a particular research project has
been completed, the information from the project may
still be valuable to further research so there is a need to
store all data securely. Data leakage of such highly sen-
sitive personal genetic information could lead to serious
privacy violations.
Some may argue the issues of genetic discrimination
arising from genetic research in China is an unnecessary
worry. However, lawsuits concerning genetic discrimin-
ation in the mainland and Hong Kong in recent years
seem to indicate otherwise. In 2001, a judicial decision
about genetic discrimination in employment in Hong
Kong caught some public attention [39]. Three young
men who have no signs of mental problems were rejected
to be employed as local civil servants because of a history
of mental illness in their parents. They sued relevant de-
partments based on the Disability Discrimination Ordin-
ance. After considering the conditions of the plaintiffs and
the inherent requirement of the positions, the court ruled
that “it was unlawful for the civil service to discriminate in
employment, for the sake of public safety, against people
with a family history of mental illness” [39]. A similar law-
suit happened in city of Foshan near Guangzhou in main-
land China in 2009. Three men were refused the positions
in the local civil service because they are carriers of the
thalassemia gene. They sued the local Human Resources
and Social Security Bureau but failed. However, genetic
testing has been removed from the list of the local civil ser-
vant enrollment health examination in May 2011 [40].
These two cases raise the issues of who could justifiably use
personal or their relatives’ medical/genetic information andin what circumstances, and how individual privacy can be
protected in this era of rapid genetics progress and biotech-
nology advances.
As early as 2000, the UK Genetics and Insurance
Committee approved that insurance coverage could be af-
fected by the result of Huntington's predictive test [41]. In
2011, a moratorium on the use of predictive testing for in-
surance policies with high payouts was extended until
2017 [42]. In 2008 the US Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act was passed to protect against damage for
the insured due to his/her genetic test results [43]. In
China, in 2010 after the Foshan genetic discrimination
lawsuit, proposal for initiating the development of a gen-
etic discrimination law has been submitted during the
National People's Congress and the Chinese Political Con-
sultative Conference [44]. So far no laws have been for-
mally legislated. However, the exposure draft of the
Regulation of the Human Genetic Resources in 2012 re-
quires that organizations or individuals not to conduct hu-
man genetic research and development that may result in
discrimination. Anyone who breaks this law shall be pun-
ished and each IRB is empowered to review and monitor
genetic research within its institution. This regulation
shows the right intention to reduce genetic discrimination
by strengthening ethical review. However, this brings on
new questions regarding the functions of an IRB. Tradition-
ally, the duty of an IRB is to review samples/data manage-
ment for the subjects who participate in a specific research
project. Its function would not extend to protect those who
suffer discrimination or stigmatization due to the long-term
impacts. To fulfill this mission, the IRB has to identify what
kinds of discrimination a particular genetic research may
cause and has to assess the possibility of risks. It is also not
clear at what risk level should the IRB prohibit a specific re-
search project. In some situations, a mere possibility would
prohibit all genetic research. How can various IRBs reach
consistent conclusions when a multi-national genetic re-
search project is carried out in different cultural contexts?
What criteria should be used to guide the assessment?
These are open questions that can hardly be solved by
merely providing a single sentence on the requirement in
legislation. Some concrete feasible methods need to be dis-
cussed. Otherwise, the good intention behind the regulation
will not have any meaningful impact in practice.
Genetic information leaks may have more far reaching
impacts than information leaks in clinics or other social
situations. Many countries have introduced legislations to
address this concern. Given the global nature of genetic
research now, one should consider whether it is morally
necessary to achieve the goal of global protection against
genetic discrimination and protection of privacy by setting
the same sets of criteria along the whole samples/data
pipeline, or whether we should leave each country the dis-
cretion to make their own rules. It also poses the practical
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countries involved in research and how to ensure those
who use genetic sample/information adhere to a uniform
requirement. Given the global reach of companies like
BGI, regulatory protection of genetic information in China
is not just of interest within the country, but also to re-
searchers worldwide.
Recent developments highlight the need for increased at-
tention to privacy issues. In 2013, researchers at Cambridge,
Massachusetts reported that the identity of an individual
who contribute their DNA sequence for research project
can be traced back by using publicly available internet re-
sources [45]. This means that there is “A potentially ser-
ious loophole that could allow anyone to unmask the
identities of people who contribute their DNA sequences
to some research projects” [45]. Recognizing the reality of
this threat, some people think it is imperative to disclose
to research subjects that “it is unlikely that their identities
can be kept hidden if their genetic data are revealed” [46].
More extreme caution is warranted because a major gen-
omic data leak may just be a matter of time, “the question
is not how to prevent a leak but how to mitigate the fall-
out” [46]. It would definitely bring unknown detrimental
risks to the subjects’ privacy. This can also damage genetic
research in the long run, because loss of trust from sub-
jects and the potential legal liabilities for compensations
may deter investment in further research.Summary
From the above, we can see that there are some appar-
ent gaps in the Chinese regulatory system regarding bio-
ethical issues related to genetic research. These issues
may partially be due to the nature of genetic research
and partially stem from the strategy of simply adopting a
general international guideline into a new practice with-
out careful consideration of the needs of genetic re-
search. However there isn’t a perfect ready-made ethical
solution to be adopted by any country, as many of these
issues are still controversial in China and other coun-
tries. Controversies exist on questions like withdrawal
from research, information feedback, and how to protect
privacy. Ethical approaches may vary greatly in different
projects carried out by different countries and institu-
tions. An influential player in the biomedical field that
processes massive amounts of global samples/data like
BGI and China as a whole has an obligation to consider
these problems. Countries that send their samples to
China for analysis also have an obligation to follow the
developments on these ethical issues in China. Finally,
we should all take part in a larger conversation about
the development of more concrete international stan-
dards to ensure scientifically sound and ethically harmo-
nious genetic research in the future.Abbreviations
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